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NOTES
Making Intellectual Property Pirates Walk
the Plank: Using "Special 301" to
Protect the United States' Rights
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the United States' dominant position as a leader
in world trade has eroded significantly.' The United States' appetite
for imported goods has consistently outpaced exports for most of the
last ten years, creating an enormous trade deficit. 2 Many economists
consider this trade deficit to be detrimental to the health of the United
States economy, blaming it for the devaluation of the dollar, the rise
of interest rates and large fluctuations in the stock market. 3 Accord-
ingly, a primary focus of U.S. trade strategy has been the reduction of
this trade deficit, predominantly by boosting exports. 4 Trade experts
perceive foreign barriers to trade as major impediments to growth in
exports, and consequently, these barriers receive the most attention. 5
Many private sector and government leaders in the United States
have cited the foreign piracy of intellectual property as a major bar-
rier to U.S. exports. 6 Numerous U.S. industrial products and artistic
works are routinely duplicated in foreign nations, 7 even though such
1. Tyson, Trade Deficit Has Lethal Fallout, L.A. Times, Apr. 2, 1989, § IV, at 2, col. 4.
2. Pine, America's Import Addiction, L.A. Times, Nov. 19, 1989, § D, at 1, col. 2. The
trade deficit is the difference between net exports and net imports. The United States annual
trade deficit for 1988 amounted to $137.9 billion. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, Di-
RECTION OF TRADE STATISTICS YEARBOOK 402 (1989).
3. Worry over Trade Deficit Helps Drive Dollar Lower, L.A. Times, Jan. 4, 1989, § IV, at
4, col. 1; Redburn, Stocks Plunge 101 As Trade Gap Rises, Unexpected Hike Pushes Interest
Up, Dollar Down, L.A. Times, Apr. 15, 1988, § I, at 1, col. 6.
4. Peterson, Analysts See Need for Further Cuts in Imports, L.A. Times, Jan. 16, 1988,
§ IV, at 1, col. 1. But see Rausch, Deficits: Economists Hot, Candidates Cool, L.A. Times, June
12, 1988, § V, at 3, col. 1. Other economists believe that export increases alone will not solve
the trade deficit, but that changes must be made to domestic governmental spending to reduce
the budget deficit as well. Id.
5. Tyson, supra note 1, at 2, col. 4.
6. FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE passim (1989). Intellec-
tual property includes patents, copyrights and trademarks. Id. at 2.
7. Unfair Foreign Trade Practices: Hearings Before the Energy and Commerce Commit-
tee, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1986) [hereinafter Hearings].
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duplication would constitute an infringement of patents or copyrights
if performed in the United States.8 By pirating intellectual property,
these nations effectively avoid royalty and development costs. Cou-
pled with their own typically cheap labor, pirate nations can provide
low cost products for their citizens.
Unfortunately, these practices cause three types of trade
problems for U.S. business. 9 First, merchandise produced in the
United States is rendered uncompetitive in these markets.' 0 In 1986,
government estimates indicated that piracy of intellectual property
cost U.S. industry $20 billion in annual sales and affected roughly
750,000 jobs.1 ' Second, where other countries import unauthorized
products from pirating nations, U.S. exports to these other markets
are adversely impacted.' 2 Lastly, U.S. companies lose sales in the
United States to illegally imported counterfeit products. 3 If pirate
nations were encouraged to adopt stricter intellectual property protec-
tion, as exists in the United States and other developed nations, U.S.
products could potentially be more competitive worldwide and the
value of U.S. exports would increase.
Guarding against this piracy is exceedingly difficult since the
U.S. intellectual property laws have no extraterritorial effect. ' 4 As
such, patent, trademark or copyright piracy is not an infringement
unless it occurs within the United States.' 5 Consequently, foreign
piracy of U.S. intellectual property does not violate U.S. law. There-
fore, to combat the undesirable practice, the United States relies on
multilateral and bilateral treaties to establish intellectual property
standards, and on the use of the U.S. trade laws for treaty
enforcement. 16
The United States is currently a party to several multilateral
8. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
9. Hearings, supra note 7, at 69 (statement of H. Bale, Assistant U.S. Trade
Representative).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 87 (statement of A. Hughes, Deputy Secretary to the Secretary of Commerce).
12. Id. at 69.
13. Id.
14. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1983); 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1977). Section 271(a) provides that
"[w]hoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United
States during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent." 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1983)
(emphasis added). Section 501(a) provides that one "who imports copies or phonorecords into
the United States . . . is an infringer of the copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1977) (emphasis
added).
15. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1983); 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1977).
16. Hearings, supra note 7, at 91-92.
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trade initiatives. For the last forty years, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") has been the cornerstone of U.S. trade
policy. 17 The GATT is a multilateral agreement between ninety-three
nations committed to reducing barriers to trade.' 8 Simultaneously,
the United States has been a member of another multilateral group,
the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"), which has
sought to develop universal standards for the protection of intellectual
property. 19 The United States has also entered into and continues to
pursue bilateral trade agreements through direct negotiations with
trading partners to reduce intellectual property barriers to trade.20
However, most attempts to reach acceptable multilateral or bilateral
agreements to specifically protect intellectual property thus far have
proven fruitless.
Congress insisted on a more combative or unilateral approach to
solving trade problems, stressing economic sanctions and retaliation,
2'
and in 1988 enacted the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
("Trade Act of 1988").22 A major purpose of the Act was to provide
negotiating objectives to U.S. trade negotiators with respect to unfair
foreign trade practices. 23 One provision of the Trade Act of 1988,
17. Interview with Ambassador Ernest Preeg, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and
International Studies (June 9, 1989) (available on Fed. News Serv.) [hereinafter Interview].
18. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE GATT NEGOTIATIONS AND U.S. TRADE
POLICY ix-xi (June 1987). GATT was formed in 1948 as a first step toward the creation of an
international trading order by the proposed International Trading Organization ("ITO"). It
was widely believed that economic protectionism had been a prime cause of World War II, and
ITO was intended to be a forum for conducting multilateral tariff negotiations. Although the
ITO charter was never approved, GATT endured as a multilateral agreement. In the 1950s,
an executive body, also known as GATT, was formed to administer the multilateral agree-
ment. J. LEW & C. STANBROOK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: LAW AND PRACTICE 183 (1983).
19. PATENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD B-47 (A. Jacobs 4th ed. 1989) [hereinafter
PATENTS]; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, opened for signature
Mar. 20, 1883, as amended, 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter
Paris Convention]. Industrial property includes patents and trademarks. Id. art. 1. WIPO is
a United Nations specialized agency empowered to administer a number of industrial property
agreements. Most notable among the administered agreements is the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, which is the major treaty regulating international industrial
property. The Paris Convention was originally concluded in 1883, and has been revised six
times since. SUBCOMMITTEE ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, REVISION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION ON INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY COMMITTEE,
H.R. Doc. No. 23, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6 (1982).
20. Hearings, supra note 7, at 77-78. See, e.g., Efforts to Negotiate Bilateral Agreements to
Curb Piracy Continuing, PTO Official Says, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1433 (Oct. 26, 1988).
21. Protecting the Baubles, L.A. Times, Feb. 14, 1988, § V, at 4, col. 1.
22. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
23. Id. § 1101, 102 Stat. 1121-24.
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known as "Special 301," specifically addresses the problem of intellec-
tual property protection. 24 Essentially, Special 301 grants the Presi-
dent broad power to retaliate unilaterally against foreign nations by
imposing economic sanctions on countries that inadequately protect
intellectual property rights.25 Presumably, Congress expected the
threat of retaliation to encourage foreign countries to enact intellec-
tual property laws similar to those of the United States. It is the au-
thor's position that Special 301 has not granted the President any
additional authority over that which he previously has been granted.
Nonetheless, Special 301 has been a success in that it has given other
countries the impression that the United States has strengthened its
resolve regarding intellectual property piracy. As a result, these
countries have reacted in the manner desired by Congress.
This Comment will focus on the Special 301 provision of the
Trade Act of 1988. First, this Comment will detail the variety of in-
tellectual property protection problems encountered throughout the
world. It will then describe the mechanics and unilateral nature of
Special 301 and contrast it with pre-existing multilateral and bilateral
trade initiatives. Then, the Comment will relate ongoing efforts to
enhance multilateral agreements and explore Special 301's role in this
process. Lastly, this Comment will suggest other non-retaliatory uni-
lateral steps which the United States could take to further its long
term objectives of obtaining universal intellectual property protection
and reducing the trade deficit.
II. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY FOREIGN PIRACY OF U.S.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
U.S. business leaders have labeled a variety of foreign customs
resulting in the piracy of intellectual property as unfair trade prac-
tices. This foreign piracy costs U.S. business billions of dollars in lost
sales abroad. 26 The most criticized of the unfair trade practices are
non-existent patent protection; inadequate enforcement of laws;
movie, video and recording piracy; mandatory licensing; and non-rec-
ognition of new technologies. 27 Developing nations defend their ac-
tions by maintaining that patent systems would hinder their
24. Id. § 1303, 102 Stat. 1179-81 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.A. § 2242 (West
Supp. 1989)).
25. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411(a) (West Supp. 1989).
26. Hearings, supra note 7, at 87.
27. COUNTRY REPORTS ON ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE PRACTICES, U.S. STATE
DEPARTMENT passim (1989) [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS].
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development and that they should be free to structure their laws dif-
ferently from those of developed countries. 28 Each of the criticized
unfair trade practices will be described below.
In a few countries, certain types of products are completely ex-
empt from national patent protection; for instance, Brazil does not
allow either product or process patent protection for metal alloys,
chemical compounds, food, pharmaceutical substances, or biotechno-
logical inventions. 29 These countries justify the exemption by
stressing the critical need of these products to prevent starvation and
disease. 30 Indira Gandhi of India summed up her nation's opposition
to pharmaceutical patents by stating that "[t]he idea of a better-or-
dered world is one in which medical discoveries will be free of patents
and there will be no profiteering from life and death. '31 Accordingly,
domestic producers of pirated commodities in these countries may in-
fringe U.S. patents with impunity.
Pirated products are primarily copied and sold for domestic use
within the pirating country. However, in some cases, counterfeit
products are exported into the markets of other countries. 32 Conse-
quently, U.S. exporters are not only locked out of the pirating nation's
market, but transshipment also causes a U.S. marketing barrier in
these other countries. Of additional concern is the potential trans-
shipment of these pirated products back into U.S. markets.33 In one
example, pirated pharmaceuticals were discovered repackaged under
forged labels for distribution and sale in the United States. 34 The
quality of the copied products is often found to be significantly infer-
ior to those made by the official manufacturer, due to the pirates' poor
quality-control methods.35 For example, deficiencies have been found
in the potency of pharmaceuticals, precision of automotive parts and
28. Indian Proposal Says Developing Countries Should Get Patent, Trademark Conces-
sions, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 953-54 (July 19, 1989).
29. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 27, at 643.
30. Gadbaw & Kenny, India, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSEN-
sus, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 186 (R. Gadbaw & T. Richards ed. 1988).
31. Id.
32. Hearings, supra note 7, at 13.
33. Id. The protection against the importation of products which infringe United States
patents is also provided for in the Trade Act of 1988, but is not addressed in this comment.
See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1337 (West Supp. 1989).
34. Hearings, supra note 7, at 14. For instance, pirated Ceclor, an Eli Lilly antibiotic
product, has been found in Singapore in counterfeit capsules with fake lot numbers, labels and
packaging, ready for shipment to the United States. Id.
35. Id.
1990]
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formula for food and liquor products. 36 Even if such potentially dan-
gerous products are kept from U.S. customers, this practice places
unwary consumers in other unsuspecting countries at substantial risk.
Some nations that do have intellectual property laws inade-
quately or unfairly enforce them. In these countries, infringers openly
operate without harassment from the law. 37 The penalties for in-
fringement are often so slight that it is not worth the cost of litigation
to bring a claim. 38 In some cases, only products patented after the
enactment of patent laws are eligible for protection. In other cases,
domestic industries are simply permitted by law to infringe even
though there are valid patents under national law. 39
Other countries' practices have a discriminatory effect on foreign
trade partners. For example, lengthy delays in processing patents and
trademarks in Japan deter U.S. businesses from exporting products
there. 4° In one extreme case, Texas Instruments, Inc., a U.S. firm,
obtained a patent in Japan for an integrated circuit invention based on
an application filed thirty years ago.
41
Another serious problem is that of movie, video and sound re-
cording copyright piracy. This has become widespread because such
works are easily duplicated.4 2 For example, in 1987, the United
States motion picture industry estimated that 80 percent of the Japa-
nese videocassette market was pirated; this translated into an annual
36. See id. at 41, 46 (counterfeit auto parts responsible for traffic accidents and counter-
feit wine causing deaths).
37. Id. at 89.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 17. For example, Monsanto Corporation has valid product and process patents
in Taiwan and the United States for its herbicide Roundup. However, a Taiwanese company
has been officially permitted to infringe the patent since 1980. The American Institute in Tai-
wan estimates Monsanto's 1985 losses in third markets to be as much as $1.6 billion. Id.
40. OPERATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, 40TH REPORT, USITC PUB.
No. 2208, at 111 (1988). In Japan, a foreign patent application can take up to six years to
process. Id. To protect their rights, U.S. firms are often forced to license their patents to
Japanese companies, rather than exporting products. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 27, at
223.
41. Japan Grants Patent for Texas Instruments Integrated Circuits After 30- Year-Long
Wait, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1564 (Nov. 29, 1989). An industry representative commented
that if the patent had issued several years ago when U.S. firms dominated the industry, it
would have been a problem for the Japanese, but since the Japanese have surpassed the United
States in competitiveness in this area, the patent will now have little effect. Id. at 1565.
42. Gadbaw & Richards, Introduction, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL
CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 4 (R. Gadbaw & T. Richards ed. 1988).
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$220 million loss to the industry.43  Since the supply of legitimate
products cannot satisfy the world demand, copyright pirate entrepre-
neurs endeavor to fill the void. As one nation tightens its copyright
laws, these pirates move to other countries with more relaxed laws. 44
In 1988, the most notorious offending nations were China and Saudi
Arabia, which were responsible for $418 million and $189 million in
estimated sales losses, respectively.
45
Many countries that have patent laws require foreign patent
holders to put the patented invention to use.46 If the patent holder
does not use the patent, these countries issue compulsory licenses to
local manufacturers to produce the patented invention without the
use constituting an infringement. 47 The United States has no compul-
sory license requirement 48 and finds the practice particularly trouble-
some.49 Its position is that an inventor should not be required to put
the invention into use and should be able to prevent others from doing
S0.50 Developing countries counter that commercial use of a patent is
a fundamental obligation of the patent owner and that compulsory
licenses prevent patent owners from misusing their rights.5'
A final area of concern involves newly emerging technologies.
Recent advancements in biotechnology and space satellite technology
are not patentable in most foreign countries. 52 For example, satellite
signal piracy has emerged as an increasing problem in Taiwan. En-
coded television broadcasts are intercepted, decoded and retransmit-
ted to domestic viewers, despite U.S. copyright protection over the
43. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 27, at 223. However, Japan has responded by enact-
ing new legislation which facilitates prosecution of suspected video pirates. Id.
44. Hearings, supra note 7, at 38 (testimony of A. Gurka, Managing Director of the CTS
Group, Hong Kong). For example, efforts to curb copyright protection in South Korea and
Singapore will likely result in the counterfeiting operations moving to the Middle East, most
likely to the Gulf state of Abu Dhabi. Efforts To Negotiate Bilateral Agreements To Curb
Piracy Continuing, PTO Official Says, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1433-34 (Oct. 26, 1988).
45. Two Worst Copyright Pirates Are China And Saudi Arabia, Report Says, Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 673 (Apr. 27, 1989).
46. PATENTS, supra note 19, at 487-88.
47. Comment, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An Idea Whose Time
Has Come, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 666, 671 (1988).
48. PATENTS, supra note 19, at U-50.
49. Hearings, supra note 7, at 82.
50. See generally Comment, supra note 47. Under a contract theory of patents, a com-
pulsory license is a failure of consideration on the part of the government; under a property
law theory of patents, a compulsory license is a taking. Id. at 681.
51. Indian Proposal Says Developing Countries Should Get Patent, Trademark Conces-
sions, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 953-54 (July 19, 1989).
52. See COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 27, at 301.
1990]
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broadcasts. 53 The growing problem of computer software piracy is
becoming widespread and few nations are effectively dealing with it.
54
The United States' competitive advantage has historically been in the
development of new technologies, 55 such as computers and biotech-
nology. Therefore, this problem area could potentially cause the
greatest harm to the U.S. economy if left unsolved.56 The United
States is not alone in the development of new technologies; other na-
tions, such as Japan and West Germany, share this concern.
57
III. COMBATTING UNFAIR TRADE: CONGRESS' UNILATERAL
TRADE SOLUTION
The United States' strategy for solving each of the described un-
fair trade practices has been to pursue bilateral and multilateral trade
agreements with its trade partners. However, acceptable agreements
have not been forthcoming. Responding to pressure from industrial
interest groups, Congress introduced a unilateral mechanism for com-
batting the unfair practices and strengthening international intellec-
tual property protection. The mechanism it selected, Special 301, is
an enhanced version of a system for combatting unfair foreign trade
practices, originally created as part of the Trade Act of 1974.58
A. Precursors to Special 301: The Trade Acts of 1974 and 1984
The Trade Act of 1974 granted general authority to the President
to take action in response to certain unfair foreign trade practices. 59
The offensive trade practices targeted did not specifically involve in-
53. Id. Taiwan is able to commit this unique form of intellectual property piracy since it
is a major producer of television broadcast equipment. Id.
54. See Hearings, supra note 7, at 82; Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 42, at 13. Singa-
pore, Taiwan, India and Mexico have recognized the availability of copyright protection for
computer software. Gadbaw & Gwynn, Intellectual Property Rights in the New GA TT Round,
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 56 (R.
Gadbaw & T. Richards ed. 1988).
55. Tyson, Managing Our High-Tech Trade, L.A. Times, Sept. 17, 1989, § IV, at 2, col.
4. High technology products account for a significant share of U.S. trade: about 38% of non-
agricultural merchandise exports and 25% of non-petroleum merchandise imports. Id.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., U.S. Marching to Its Own Tune: Chips and Beyond, 8 P.T.C. NEWSLETTER
15 (1990). Both the United States and Japan opposed adoption of a treaty for protection of
semiconductor chip designs, since it was riddled with loopholes and had no dispute settlement
provision. Id.
58. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2290 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487).
59. Id. at 2364.
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tellectual property but were confined to actions of foreign govern-
ments that were discriminatory, unjustifiable or unreasonable and
which burdened or restricted U.S. commerce. 60 Under section 301 of
the 1974 law, the President could take unilateral action against these
countries by restricting or withholding anticipated benefits stemming
from existing trade agreements, or imposing duties or import restric-
tions on the products of these countries. 6'
The amendment of the Trade Act of 1974 by the Trade and
Tariff Act of 1984 considerably strengthened section 301 .62 The 1984
Act broadened the President's authority to retaliate against unfair for-
eign trade practices. Specifically, the 1984 Act mandated new negoti-
ating objectives and established procedures and timetables for
initiating an investigation by the United States Trade Representative
("USTR") into offensive trade practices. 63 Congress finally acknowl-
edged the growing problem of inadequate intellectual property protec-
tion by defining an "unreasonable" policy as one which does not
necessarily violate "international legal rights of the United States,"
but "denies fair and equitable ... protection of intellectual property
rights."64
Having granted the President increased authority, Congress be-
came impatient with his apparent unwillingness to exercise it. By
1988, the United States had not retaliated against any country for
intellectual property abuses. Amid protectionist fervor to combat un-
fair trade practices, Congress once again sought to strengthen the
trade laws, this time by identifying a more stringent directive to man-
date retaliation against such abuses.65
However, the Reagan administration opposed additional changes
to the trade law, arguing that current law already gave the President
adequate negotiating authority over intellectual property protection. 66
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2365.
62. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, §§ 301-304, 98 Stat. 2948, 3000
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2111-2487).
63. Id. § 304, 98 Stat. 3004-05. Executive order created the office of the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) and designated it to be the President's agent in all trade negotia-
tions. Exec. Order No. 12,188, 45 Fed. Reg. 993 (1980).
64. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, §§ 301-304, 98 Stat. 2948, 3004-05
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2111-2487).
65. A Strong Flavor of Protectionism, L.A. Times, Mar. 29, 1987, § V, at 4, col. 1.
66. Intellectual Property and Trade.: Oversight Hearings Before the Judiciary Committee,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 55-56 (1987) (testimony of A. Zalik, former Assistant General Counsel
to the USTR) [hereinafter Oversight Hearings]. Other critics of the proposed law attacked
Congress for putting limits on presidential discretion with mandatory sanctions, calling such
1990] 733
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Further, the administration asserted that the additional reports and
mandatory negotiations required by the proposed law would put addi-
tional strain on the USTR's already thin staff and interfere with ongo-
ing trade negotiations. 67 Nonetheless, during the final stages of the
1988 presidential campaign, Congress enacted the Trade Act of 1988
which included mandatory retaliation. 68
B. Special 301 of the Trade Act of 1988
The Trade Act of 1988 notably strengthened section 301.69 The
Special 301 provision of the Trade Act requires mandatory responsive
action to resolve the specific problem of intellectual property protec-
tion.7° Once the USTR determines that a foreign practice either vio-
lates a trade agreement or unjustifiably burdens United States
commerce, the President must take mandatory responsive action .7
Special 301 is a more focused version of a broader law, popularly
known as "Super 301," which mandates similar responsive action
against a wide variety of other unfair trade practices.
7 2
The stated objective of Special 301 is to "seek enactment and
effective enforcement by foreign countries of laws which recognize
and adequately protect intellectual property. ' 73 This legislative pur-
pose stems from Congress' finding that:
(A) international protection of intellectual property rights is vital
limits counterproductive to attaining free trade. Crucial Trade Tests, L.A. Times, Mar. 11,
1988, § II, at 6, col. 1.
67. Oversight Hearings, supra note 66, at 56.
68. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1301, 102
Stat. 1107, 1164. President Reagan vetoed the original version of the law on May 24, 1988
because it included a provision requiring employers to notify employees of plant closings and
layoffs. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1547. The disputed provision is not in the enacted version of the law.
Id.
69. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1301, 102
Stat. 1107, 1164.
70. Id. § 1303, 102 Stat. 1179.
71. 19 U.S.C.A. § 241 1(a)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
72. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411 (West Supp. 1989). Besides intellectual property abuses, the
Trade Act of 1988 also seeks to eliminate foreign practices which deny either the opportunity
to establish an enterprise or market access through anti-competitive behavior, or which consti-
tute export targeting or unfair labor practices. Id. § 2411(d). For additional information on
Super 301, see Comment, Section 301 of the Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988: Its History
and Implications in the U.S.-South Korea Trade, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REV. 549 (1989).
73. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 522, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1547, 1555.
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to the international competitiveness of United States persons that
rely on protection of intellectual property rights; and
(B) the absence of adequate and effective protection of United
States intellectual property rights, and the denial of fair and equita-
ble market access, seriously impede the ability of the United States
persons that rely on protection of intellectual property rights to
export and operate overseas, thereby harming the economic inter-
est of the United States.
74
Under the Special 301 mechanism, the USTR must first identify
"priority" countries. 75 These are the countries that "have the most
onerous or egregious acts, policies, or practices that (i) deny adequate
and effective intellectual property rights, or (ii) deny fair and equita-
ble market access to United States persons that rely upon intellectual
property protection. ' 76 The identification of priority countries can
stem from a petition for investigation filed by "any interested per-
son,"' 77 or from information provided by other sources within the fed-
eral government, such as the Register of Copyrights and the
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks. 78 This priority identifica-
tion must be completed by April thirtieth of each year, 79 and a list of
these priority countries must be published in the Federal Register.80
The USTR must then initiate an investigation into the allegations of
unfair trade practices of these priority countries"' and can attempt to
negotiate a bilateral agreement which settles the dispute.8 2 If the in-
vestigation reveals that U.S. rights are being denied and the USTR is
unsatisfied with the priority country's progress toward a bilateral
agreement within eighteen months of the initiation of the investiga-
tion, the President must take responsive action.
3
The President has a broad range of potential responsive actions
available.8 4 Specifically, the Act authorizes the President to impose
74. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1303(a),
102 Stat. 1107, 1179.
75. 19 'U.S.C.A. § 2242(a) (West Supp. 1989).
76. Id. § 2242(b)(1)(A).
77. Id. § 2412.
78. Id. § 2242(b)(2).
79. Id. §§ 2241-2242. Section 22 4 2(a) requires the priority identification to be complete
thirty days after publishing the National Trade Estimate report, which is due on March thirty-
first of each succeeding year, per section 2241(b). Id. § 2242(a).
80. Id. § 2242(e).
81. Id. § 2412(b)(2)(A).
82. Id. § 241 1(c)(1)(C).
83. Id. §§ 2 411(a), 2414(a).
84. Id. § 2411 (c).
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duties or other import restrictions on the goods of the priority coun-
try.85 The President may also suspend, withdraw, or prevent the ap-
plication of benefits of trade agreements with the priority country.
8 6
However, the Act emphasizes that the imposition of duties be given
preference over other types of import restriction.8 7 Additionally, the
goods selected for duties or restrictions need not be related to the dis-
puted practice of the priority country. 88
Despite the tough language of the law, there are important loop-
holes which permit the President to avoid taking the mandatory re-
sponsive action. 89 The law allows the dispute resolution process of
GATT to handle the investigation of the unfair trade practice alleged
by the USTR.90 If a GATT dispute resolution panel finds that United
States rights are not being denied, or that the foreign practice does not
deny the United States benefits pursuant to any trade agreement, the
President is not required to take responsive action. 9' A second loop-
hole centers on the meaning of "satisfactory progress." The USTR
need only find that the foreign country under investigation is making
satisfactory progress toward the protection of intellectual property
rights to toll the mandatory responsive action; a bilateral trade agree-
ment does not have to be finalized. 92 The USTR can also waive
mandatory responsive action if the country agrees to stop the disputed
practice,93 or if the proposed responsive action would have an adverse
impact on the U.S. economy 94 or cause serious harm to national
security. 95
C. Applying Special 301 to the Unfair Trade Problems
Since the enactment of Special 301, the United States has taken
responsive action against two nations for intellectual property
piracy. 96 In reaction to a USTR investigation of Brazil, initiated at
85. Id. § 2411(c)(1)(B).
86. Id. § 2411 (c)(1)(A).
87. Id. § 2411(c)(5)(A).
88. Id. § 2411(c)(3).
89. Id. § 2411(a)(2).
90. Id. § 241 l(a)(2)(A). See infra section IV(A) of this Comment for a discussion of the
GATT dispute resolution process.
91. Id.
92. Id. § 2411(a)(2)(B).
93. Id. § 241 1(a)(2)(B)(ii).
94. Id. § 2411 (a)(2)(B)(iv).
95. Id. § 2411(a)(2)(B)(v).
96. Actions taken against Brazil and Thailand stem from investigations initiated prior to
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the request of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's Association, Presi-
dent Reagan imposed a $39 million sanction by placing additional tar-
iffs on a list of specified Brazilian goods. 97 This sanction was equal to
the USTR's estimate of lost sales by United States pharmaceutical
manufacturers due to patent piracy in Brazil.98 In discussing the ac-
tion, former USTR Clayton Yeutter commented that "[r]etaliation
should be an action of last resort on any trade dispute; that has been
the case here . . [but] patent piracy simply cannot go
unchallenged." 99
Similarly, the United States retaliated against Thailand by modi-
fying that country's duty-free status for its failure to adequately pro-
tect intellectual property.10° Duty-free treatment is a benefit that the
United States affords to several developing nations under a program
known as the Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP"). 1° 1 GSP
treatment allows these developing nations to export goods to the
United States without many of the duties normally imposed on devel-
oped nations.102 However, President Reagan revoked the special
treatment after USTR efforts to resolve Thailand's failure to protect
intellectual property rights broke down. 0 3
In 1989, the USTR did not identify any nations as priority na-
tions for investigation and possible responsive action under Special
301. Instead, President Bush administratively created an intermedi-
ate step not required by Special 301 by establishing a "watch list" of
twenty-five countries. 1°4 This watch list identifies two categories of
countries with unfair intellectual property trade practices. '0 5 The first
the enactment of Special 301 under the authority of existing law. However, they are described
in this section since they typify the investigation and responsive action of Special 301.
97. OPERATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, 40TH REPORT, USITC PuB.
No. 2208, at 134-35 (1988); Gerstenzang & Pine, U.S. Moves to Curb Imports From Brazil,
L.A. Times, July 23, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
98. Reagan, Charging Patent Piracy, Imposes Sanctions on $39 Million of Brazilian Goods,
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1415 (Oct. 26, 1988).
99. Id.
100. Memorandum for the United States Trade Representative, 54 Fed. Reg. 3,573 (1989);
President Reagan Denies Thailand Larger GSP Benefits, Citing Intellectual Property Record,
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 96 (Jan. 25, 1989).
101. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2461 (West Supp. 1989).
102. Id.
103. President Reagan Denies Thailand Larger GSP Benefits, Citing Intellectual Property
Record, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 96 (Jan. 25, 1989).
104. USTR Defends Administration's Naming of Japan, India, Brazil Under Super 301,
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 684 (May 31, 1989).
105. "Special 301" on Intellectual Property, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 718-19 (May 31,
1989).
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category, or "priority" watch list countries, are those that could meet
the statutory criteria for priority country identification but are mak-
ing some progress in recent bilateral or multilateral negotiations.
10 6
The President gave these priority watch list countries six months to
show positive progress before naming them as priority countries, thus
triggering the Special 301 mechanism. 10 7  The second category of
watch list countries are those that have a lesser degree of inadequate
intellectual property protection and were given one year to prove pro-
gress.10 8 Under both categories, the mandatory investigation mecha-
nism and responsive action timetable of Special 301 was not triggered
because the countries were put on a watch list rather than the Special
301 priority list. It seems that the Bush administration's intermediate
approach intended to prod these countries into action, without actu-
ally retaliating against them. This tactic met with a mixed reaction
from Congress; some legislators applauded the President's restraint,
while others criticized the action as being weak. 10 9
D. Criticism of Special 301
Even though the new law was intended to be tougher on unfair
trade than pre-existing law, Special 301 fails to give the President any
new authority other than that previously available. For example,
Congress gave the President authority to take responsive action
against unfair trade practices in the 1984 Trade Act. 10 This author-
ity was essentially recodified in Special 301. 11 Furthermore, the
loopholes in Special 301 give the President considerable discretion to
avoid responsive action, if for political or economic reasons he so
106. See id. The eight countries placed on the priority watch list are Brazil, India, Mex-
ico, People's Republic of China, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and Thailand. Id.
at 719.
107. Id. at 718-19.
108. Id. at 719. Countries on the watch list include Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia,
Egypt, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Tur-
key, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Id.
109. USTR Defends Administration's Naming of Japan, India, Brazil Under Super 301,
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 684 (May 31, 1989). Senator Dole praised the administration's action,
calling it "the right call." Id. Rep. Gephardt criticized the Bush administration for not taking
stronger action and for not making "these intellectual property pirates walk the plank." 135
CONG. REC. E1552-53 (daily ed. May 4, 1989).
110. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1985). Section 2411(a) provided that after the President deter-
mines that action is appropriate in response to barriers to market access "the President shall
take all appropriate and feasible action within his power to enforce such rights or to obtain the
elimination of such act, policy, or practice." Id. § 241 l(a)(B)(ii).
111. 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2242, 2411 (West Supp. 1989).
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chooses. 112 This effectively thwarts Congress' intent to mandate re-
sponsive action. For these reasons, it appears that the Reagan admin-
istration's criticism of the new law was valid and that Special 301 is
substantively unnecessary.
Despite this criticism, Special 301 has already shown some signs
of success. Shortly after its enactment, the United States and Indone-
sia signed a bilateral agreement to protect copyrights on a variety of
creative works. 113 Indonesia had long been considered a haven for
copyright piracy." 4 Additionally, Indonesia enacted its first patent
law in November 1989, after over thirty years of discussion." 5
China, also one of the worst copyright offenders, signed a memo-
randum of agreement during bilateral talks with the United States
agreeing to enact a copyright law to protect computer software."
6
This action occurred simultaneously with the President's placing of
China on the Special 301 priority watch list. 17 China also agreed to
finish an amendment to its patent law and to join in international fo-
rums for the protection of intellectual property rights."
8
Most likely, the threat of retaliation prompted both Indonesia
and China to finally acknowledge U.S. demands to protect its intellec-
tual property. In other words, even though Special 301 gives the
President no additional power, the tougher language has created the
illusion that an enhanced weapon against unfair trade exists, and this
has scared pirating nations into action.
IV. CONTRASTING SPECIAL 301 WITH MULTILATERAL AND
BILATERAL COMMITMENTS
Despite the initial success of Special 301, many foreign govern-
ments condemn the United States for using unilateral retaliatory
112. 19 U.S.C.A. § 241 l(a)(2) (West Supp. 1989). See, e.g., U.S. Message to Brazil Seen
Linking 301 to Sale of U.S. Telecommunications Equipment, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1085
(Aug. 23, 1989). President Bush hinted at resolving the trade dispute with Brazil in return for
expanded access into the Brazilian telecommunications market. Id. at 1085-86.
113. U.S., Indonesia Sign Bilateral Agreement to Protect Copyrights, Effective Aug. 1, Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 464 (Apr. 12, 1989). The agreement will protect copyrights on books,
sound recordings, films, computer software, and other works. Id.
114. Id.
115. Gingerich, Indonesia: New Patent Law, IP Asia, Nov. 22, 1989, at 18.
116. China Agrees To Push for Copyright Protection of Computer Software, Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 818 (June 21, 1989).
117. Id. The bilateral agreement was signed on May 19, 1989. Id.
118. Id. The draft amendment is intended to extend the term and expand the scope of
patent protection. Id.
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measures, because they contradict the objectives of existing multilat-
eral commitments. The supporters of Special 301 counter that the
unilateral action complements and enhances multilateral and bilateral
agreements and improves the prospects for future compromises.
Not surprisingly, the loudest condemnation of Special 301 has
come from the watch list countries. These countries argue that the
law is a protectionist measure which does little to further the interna-
tional objective of eliminating barriers to trade, as promoted by
GATT. Moreover, the Special 301 responsive action is in fact a new
barrier to trade.1 19 Secondly, developing nations argue that intellec-
tual property rights are not required under international agreements,
such as the Paris Convention, 120 and that their "violation" is therefore
not an unfair trade practice. In the following sections, Special 301
will be analyzed in light of the United States' commitments to these
two multilateral agreements, namely GATT and the WIPO Paris
Convention. The United States' efforts to negotiate bilateral trade
agreements will also be briefly examined.1
21
A. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
The United States was one of the principle GATT architects,
signing as a contracting party on October 30, 1947.122 GATT basi-
cally sets out a conciliatory process for negotiating substantive trade
agreements with the purpose of reducing tariffs, preferences and other
trade barriers, on a "reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis.'
'1 23
The GATT Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade provides spe-
cific rules for adopting trade regulations. 124 To date, GATT has suc-
cessfully reduced tariffs on imported products and has made
significant progress on reducing other non-tariff barriers to trade. 125
Yet, GATT has accomplished little in the area of intellectual property
protection.
The primary criticism of Special 301 is that it conflicts with
119. See infra notes 122-139 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 140-151 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 152-155 and accompanying text.
122. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, reprinted
in 4 BEVANS, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, 1776-1949, 639 (1970).
123. Id. at 640.
124. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Multilateral Negotiations: Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade, March 29, 1979, art. 2, 18 I.L.M. 1079, 1081-1111.
125. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 18, at 61.
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many of GATT's requirements. 126 A principle area of conflict with
Special 301 concerns GATT's non-discrimination provision. GATT
provides that imported products receive identical treatment as domes-
tically produced products with regard to tariffs and regulations.
127
Accordingly, country A could not levy discriminatory tariffs or re-
strictions on products imported from country B, unless country A
levies a similar tariff or restriction on its own products.
However, intellectual property is not a "product" covered by
GATT. 28  Therefore, inadequate protection of intellectual property
could not be considered discriminatory treatment, and the pirating
nations are not in violation of GATT. Nevertheless, the typical re-
sponsive action provided by Special 301, the levying of retaliatory tar-
iffs on an offending nation's exported products, is a violation of
GATT's objective. This is because Special 301 puts a retaliatory tariff
on GATT-protected goods in response to a non-GATT violation.
Therefore, unless the scope of GATT is expanded to protect intellec-
tual property, the responsive action envisioned under Special 301 vio-
lates GATT's non-discrimination objective.
A second conflict between GATT and Special 301 concerns the
friction created within the GATT dispute resolution process. GATT
provides for bilateral consultation of trade problems between the trad-
ing partners involved, with an emphasis on directly negotiating a set-
tlement. 129 When this process fails, an independent panel of experts
126. US. Comes Under Attack over Trade Policy at GA TT Council Meeting, Defends Super
301, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 830 (June 28, 1989).
127. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 18, at 18-19. Section 2.1 of GATT
provides that
products imported from the territory of any Party shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin and to like products
originating in any other country in relation to such technical regulations or stan-
dards. They shall likewise ensure that neither technical regulations nor standards
themselves nor their application have the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to
international trade.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Multilateral Negotiations: Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade, March 29, 1979, art. 2, § 2.1, 18 I.L.M. 1079, 1082-83.
128. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Multilateral Negotiations: Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade, March 29, 1979, art 1.3, 18 I.L.M. 1079, 1082. Article 1.3 of the
agreement includes "industrial and agricultural products." Id.
129. Id. § 14.2, at 1098. Section 14.2 provides that
[if] any Party considers that any benefit accruing to it, directly or indirectly, under
this Agreement is being nullified or impaired, or that the attainment of any objective
of this Agreement is being impeded by another Party or Parties, and that its trade
interests are significantly affected, the Party may make written representations or
proposals to the other Party or Parties which it considers to be concerned.
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can be formed to devise a solution to the problem. 130
Special 301 encourages the use of bilateral negotiations, such as
GATT's expert panel process, for resolution of the trade problem.
13 1
Additionally, Special 301 provides for tolling of the responsive action
mechanism once a GATT panel has determined that the United
States' rights are not violated. 132 However, these actions occur only
after the President has labeled an offending nation as an "unfair
trader" by placing that nation on the priority list and publishing this
status in the Federal Register. 133 Although this action alone carries
no direct economic effect, some of GATT's member nations have bris-
tled at the accusation of being an unfair trader and have indicated
that such branding makes future negotiations more difficult. 1
3 4
A final area of conflict involves Special 301's treatment of devel-
oping countries. GATT acknowledges that developing countries are
confronted by special problems and recognizes that developed coun-
tries should "take account of the special development, financial and
trade needs of developing countries."' 135 Accordingly, developed na-
tions should "provide differential and more favourable treatment to
developing countr[ies]." 136 In violation of this objective, Special 301
does not differentiate between developing and developed nations in its
identification of priority countries.
Most of the countries cited for abuse of U.S. intellectual property
rights are historically considered developing countries. However,
many-of these same nations are now exporting sizable amounts of
products 137 and are crossing over from the developing stage to the
130. Id. § 14.9, at 1099. The independent expert group would "examine the matter; con-
sult with the Parties to the dispute and give full opportunity for them to develop a mutually
satisfactory solution; make a statement concerning the facts of the matter; and make such
findings as will assist the Committee in making recommendations or give rulings on the matter
.... .Id. at 1099-1100.
131. 19 U.S.C.A. § 241 1(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1989).
132. Id. § 241 1(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
133. Id. § 2242(a).
134. USTR Defends Administration's Naming of Japan, India, Brazil Under Super 301,
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 684 (May 31, 1989). After being placed on the Super 301 priority list,
Japan reacted angrily and threatened to refuse to participate in future negotiations. Id. at 685.
Japan's Vice Minister of Trade, Shigeo Muraoka, declared that the United States' action con-
travened GATT, and said, " 'We should seriously question ourselves what would happen to
the GATT if many other countries' follow the United States' example." Pine, Trade Leaders
Pledge World Pact in 1990, L.A. Times, June 5, 1989, § IV, at 2, col. 6.
135. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Multilateral Negotiations: Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade, Mar. 29, 1979, art. 12.3, 18 I.L.M. 1079, 1095.
136. Id.
137. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 2, passim. For example, in 1988,
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status of developed nations. These countries must therefore accept
the responsibility of such status. Secondly, protection of intellectual
property rights may hasten developing nations' progress towards de-
veloped status, by encouraging investment by U.S. industrial interests
in these countries. 38 Lastly, the United States provides many devel-
oping countries with a variety of benefits ranging from reduced tariffs
to direct financial aid, under various provisions of the U.S. trade
laws. 139 Thus, the United States has more than satisfied its commit-
ment to this GATT objective.
B. The Paris Convention
The second major multilateral agreement affected by Special 301
is the Paris Convention, under the sponsorship of WIPO.14° The
Paris Convention provides a format and standards for the interna-
tional protection of certain types of intellectual property, namely pat-
ents, trademarks and industrial designs. The United States has been a
signatory to the agreement since May 30, 1887.' 4' However, the
United States has found the Paris Convention unsatisfactory because
the treaty provides very little substantive intellectual property
protection. 142
The primary objection which the United States has with the
Paris Convention involves the extreme laxity of the agreement's
rules.143 For example, the Paris Convention provides:
Nationals of any country of the Union shall, as regards the protec-
tion of industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries of the
Union the advantages that their respective laws now grant, or may
hereafter grant, to nationals ... [T]hey shall have the same protec-
Brazil had $33.7 billion of total exports, India had $13.3 billion, and Thailand had $15.8 bil-
lion. Id. at Il1, 222, 378.
138. USTR Defends Administration's Naming of Japan, India, Brazil Under Super 301,
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 684 (May 31, 1989). Carla Hills, USTR, defended United States
action against developing countries by stating, "[h]ow better to get capital in to provide jobs
for their people and real opportunity to make them have the money in their pockets to be
investors themselves? We think it has a terrific potential." Id.
139. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2701 (1988) (provides duty-free treatment to developing nations
in the Caribbean basin and Central America); id. § 2461 (provides duty-free treatment to de-
veloping nations as specified by the President); 22 U.S.C. § 4701 (1988) (provides undergradu-
ate scholarships to students from developing nations); id. § 2151 (provides economic assistance
to developing countries to foster development of economic, political and social institutions).
140. Paris Convention, supra note 19.
141. PATENTS, supra note 19, at B-47.
142. Gadbaw & Gwynn, supra note 54, at 49, 52.
143. Id.
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tion as the latter, and the same legal remedy against any infringe-
ment of their rights. 14"
In other words, member countries are not required to enact any na-
tional laws protecting intellectual property, but any laws that are en-
acted must be non-discriminatory against foreigners. Consequently,
almost every one of the Special 301 watch list nations are in full com-
pliance with the terms of the Paris Convention, since they provide no
intellectual property protection to either foreigners or to their own
domestic industry.
A second objection the United States has with the Paris Conven-
tion is that it has virtually no means of enforcement. Under article 28
of the agreement, disputes between member nations are brought
before the International Court of Justice for adjudication, unless the
countries in question agree on another method of settlement. 145 How-
ever, the same article also gives member nations the option of not
being bound by the dispute resolution provision. 146 Therefore, if a
member nation attempts to bring a complaint against another member
for an alleged violation, the accused member may avoid any resolu-
tion of the complaint and continue the offending practice unabated.
Between lax rules and non-enforcement, the Paris Convention
agreement provides practically no intellectual property protection for
its members. As an example of the agreement's ineffectiveness, the
WIPO Secretariat granted membership to India, a nation with virtu-
ally no intellectual property protection, without requiring any change
in its laws or practices.147
A third area of dispute over the Paris Convention is that the
agreement allows member nations to grant compulsory licenses to in-
sure that registered patents are put into commercial use. 148 This prac-
tice has been criticized by United States private sector interest groups
as an unfair trade practice, since it takes the use of the patent out of
the control of the inventor.149
Although provisions of Special 301 do not directly conflict with
those of the Paris Convention, the agreements will conflict in practice.
Special 301 is intended to be used to combat inadequate intellectual
144. Paris Convention, supra note 19, art. 2(1).
145. Id. art. 28(1).
146. Id. art. 28(2).
147. Gadbaw & Gwynn, supra note 54, at 49.
148. Paris Convention, supra note 19, art. 5.
149. Hearings, supra note 7, at 82. See discussion of United States opposition to compul-
sory licenses at section II of this Comment.
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property protection and violations of international law and agree-
ments. o50  However, Paris Convention member nations that inade-
quately protect intellectual property are not in violation of the Paris
Convention so long as their national laws are non-discriminatory.1 51
Therefore, the United States' responsive action under Special 301
could conceivably punish nations for practices which are consistent
with international law.
C. Bilateral Trade Agreements
In order to curb specific instances of intellectual property piracy,
the United States pursues numerous bilateral trade agreements di-
rectly with offending nations. Bilateral agreements represent an im-
portant element in resolving these trade disputes and can improve the
chances of reaching multilateral agreement. 5 2 However, they have
also been criticized for conflicting with multilateral objectives. 5 3 Bi-
lateral trade discussions are underway with Brazil, India, Thailand,
Malaysia, Canada, Japan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Mex-
ico. 154 Agreements have already been reached with Indonesia, Tai-
wan and Singapore. 5 5 By definition, these trade agreements will not
conflict with Special 301. Once the nations agree to curb intellectual
property abuses, Special 301 is no longer necessary.
V. ACHIEVING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
WITHOUT ACTUALLY TAKING RESPONSIVE ACTION
Despite the criticism, Special 301 has had a positive effect in
forcing the issue of intellectual property piracy to the forefront. 5 6
150. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2242(b) (West Supp. 1989).
151. See Paris Convention, supra note 19, art. 2(1).
152. Oversight Hearings, supra note 66, at 60. Once countries have improved levels of
protection afforded to intellectual property, they would be more amenable to support either a
GATT or WIPO sponsored agreement. Id.
153. Interview, supra note 17. Ambassador Preeg maintains that bilateral agreements are
the "antithesis" of multilateral agreements and should be avoided if they will undercut the
multilateral agreements. Id.
154. Hearings, supra note 7, at 92; Efforts To Negotiate Bilateral Agreements To Curb
Piracy Continuing, PTO Official Says, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1433-34 (Oct. 26, 1988). Ac-
cording to Ann Hughes, Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of Commerce, bilateral
activities have led to the "greatest progress" in resolving trade disputes. Hearings, supra note
7, at 92.
155. Recent Progress on Intellectual Property Matters, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 719-20
(May 31, 1989); Efforts To Negotiate Bilateral Agreements To Curb Piracy Continuing, PTO
Official Says, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1433 (Oct. 26, 1988).
156. Intellectual Property Is Priority Issue for Midterm Review, Canadian Official Says,
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This may provide the needed momentum to obtain an acceptable mul-
tilateral agreement. The positive effect of this momentum could be
further enhanced by applying other kinds of non-retaliatory unilateral
U.S. action.
A. Efforts to Enhance Existing Multilateral Agreements
Although developed nations are increasingly interested in ex-
panding international intellectual property protection, thus far there
has been no tangible progress in achieving real agreement. This may
change since the GATT member nations are now attempting to ex-
pand GATT to cover intellectual property protection. Multilateral
discussions of intellectual property protection under the GATT
framework began in September 1986 in Punta del Este, Uruguay;
these discussions have come to be known as the Uruguay Round. 15
7
This was the eighth such round of talks since the formation of GATT
and was intended to address a number of problems with GATT, espe-
cially intellectual property protection.158
Recognizing the importance of intellectual property rights to
trade, the GATT members established clear negotiating objectives for
the Uruguay Round talks. The stated objectives are as follows:
In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to international
trade, and taking into account the need to promote effective and
adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure
that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property
rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade, the
negotiations shall aim to clarify GATT provisions and elaborate,
as appropriate, new rules and disciplines.1 59
The objectives focus on developing a multilateral framework for pro-
tecting and enforcing intellectual property along the lines of existing
GATT initiatives and stress that the framework should not conflict
with initiatives taken by WIPO. 160
Despite this rhetoric, the Uruguay Round has not yielded signifi-
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1402 (Oct. 19, 1988). Canada's ambassador for multilateral negotia-
tions, Sylvia Ostry, identified intellectual property protection as the top issue before the
GATT. Id.
157. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Sept. 20, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1623 (1986).
158. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 18, at 42.
159. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Decisions on Negotiating Structure and




cant progress. At the Uruguay Round Midterm Review in April
1989, the GATT ministers renewed their agreement on broad objec-
tives for intellectual property rights negotiations and the importance
of reducing tensions. 161 They further agreed that negotiations should
include the development of a multilateral framework of principles,
rules and disciplines. 162 However, no specific agreement was reached.
Developing nations, notably Brazil and India, have been largely
responsible for the impasse by objecting to the inclusion of intellectual
property protection in GATT.163 These countries maintain that intel-
lectual property protection should be dealt with by WIPO and that it
does not belong in GATT.164 Leading the critics, India has declared
that "[p]rotection of intellectual property rights has no direct or sig-
nificant relationship to international trade .... It would therefore not
be appropriate to establish within the framework of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade any new rules and disciplines con-
cerning the availability, scope and use of intellectual property
rights."' 165 Since GATT governs trade relations between nations, and
enforcement of intellectual property is internal to an individual na-
tion's jurisdiction, India maintains that the two concepts are
incompatible. 166
The position taken by the developing countries stems partly from
the historic split between GATT and WIPO. Developing nations
have historically gravitated to WIPO where they now hold a greater
degree of control. 167 In contrast, the developed nations have grown
more accustomed to managing their trade issues under the GATT
forum. 168 Naturally, the developed nations feel more comfortable and
161. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Decisions Adopted at the Mid-Term Re-
view of the Uruguay Round, Apr. 8, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1023, 1030-31 (1989).
162. Id.
163. OPERATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, 40TH REPORT, USITC PUB.
No. 2208, 10 (1988).
164. Indian Proposal Says Developing Countries Should Get Patent, Trademark Conces-
sions, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 953 (July 19, 1989); Nordic Countries Attempt To Break Dead-
lock on Bringing Intellectual Property into GATT, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1402 (Oct. 19,
1988).
165. Indian Proposal Says Developing Countries Should Get Patent, Trademark Conces-
sions, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 953 (July 19, 1989).
166. India Accepts Policing of Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights in MTN Talks,
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1176 (Sept. 20, 1989).
167. Gadbaw & Gwynn, supra note 54, at 49. Over the years, developing nations have
consistently resisted efforts by the developed nations to enhance intellectual property protec-
tion under the Paris Convention. Id. at 40.
168. Id. at 42. GATT has gained the reputation of being an institution that is capable of
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in control if the issue is kept before GATT and have resisted calls to
shift it to WIPO. 169 Since the intellectual property protection scheme
provided under WIPO is largely inadequate, shifting the issue to that
forum would likely doom it to failure.
While U.S. negotiators at the Uruguay Round have attempted to
focus attention on the development of a new multilateral agreement to
protect intellectual property, their efforts have been sidetracked by
fallout from the Special 301 action taken against Brazil. The United
States had responded to Brazil's failure to protect pharmaceutical pat-
ents by placing tariffs totaling $39 million on Brazilian imports to the
United States.170 A recent GATT report criticized the United States'
unilateral action as being inconsistent with its multilateral commit-
ments to GATT.' 7  Responding to the economic sanctions, Brazil
filed a complaint with GATT alleging that the U.S. action contra-
vened GATT. 172 While the United States has attempted to downplay
the situation, Brazil has initiated a GATT expert panel to examine the
legality of the U.S. action. 173 A GATT panel finding that the United
States acted illegally may preclude the United States from taking re-
sponsive action against other priority countries and may enable Brazil
to respond with equivalent sanctions against the United States, effec-
tively nullifying the U.S. action.
The Uruguay Round deadlock appears to have finally broken as
India, on September 12, 1989, accepted the principle of protecting in-
tellectual property rights under GATT.' 7 4 As a compromise, India
said that it would not contribute any additional money to cover the
enforcement mechanism that GATT eventually develops. 175 An even
more surprising development occurred in December of 1989, when
Brazil presented its own plan to begin enforcing intellectual property
169. See Intellectual Property Is Priority Issue for Midterm Review, Canadian Official Says,
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1402 (Oct. 19, 1988).
170. Reagan, Charging Patent Piracy, Imposes Sanctions on $39 Million of Brazilian Goods,
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1415 (Oct. 26, 1988). See associated text in this Comment, Section
III(B).
171. U.S. Commitment to Uruguay Round Perceived As Inconsistent with Policies, Report
Finds, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1646 (Dec. 20, 1989).
172. OPERATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, 40TH REPORT, USITC PUB.
No. 2208, 135 (1988).
173. U.S. Accepts Creation of GATT Panel To Study Sanctions on Brazilian Pharmaceuti-
cal Goods, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 238 (Feb. 22, 1989).
174. India Accepts Policing of Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights in MTN Talks,




protection under the auspices of GATT. 176 Although the Uruguay
Round ends in December 1990, GATT negotiators are optimistic that
an agreement can be reached by that time.' 7
7
The dramatic change of position by the developing nations repre-
sents a significant breakthrough in attaining the goal of the interna-
tional protection of intellectual property. It is certainly no
coincidence that this occurred so soon after placing both India and
Brazil on the Special 301 watch list. However, it still remains uncer-
tain whether the current interest in intellectual property protection
will result in any substantive agreement 178 or whether the change in
heart was intended only to forestall additional responsive action
against the two watch list countries. Realizing an effective multilat-
eral agreement will solve the critical problem of piracy of intellectual
property and render the question of unilateral action under Special
301 moot.
B. Unilateral Alternatives to Special 301 Retaliation
In addition to the unilateral retaliatory actions under Special
301, the United States could consider other types of unilateral action.
The Senate has specifically recommended two alternative solutions,
which were both eliminated during the negotiations for the Trade Act
of 1988.179 One rejected Senate amendment would have furnished fi-
nancial assistance to aid developing countries in establishing systems
for implementing intellectual property laws. 180 The other Senate pro-
posal would have established an Intellectual Property Training Insti-
tute, which would have trained individuals from developing countries
in management and technical skills involved with the protection of
intellectual property. 181 While these initiatives were presumably re-
jected because of their cost, they might be of little real benefit without
176. European Community, Brazil Submit Proposals To Integrate Intellectual Property into
GATT, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1663 (Dec. 20, 1989). Under the Brazilian plan, a GATT
agreement would cover trade related aspects of intellectual property but standards for national
protection would remain under the auspices of the Paris Convention. Id. at 1664.
177. Id. at 1663.
178. See, e.g., Intellectual Property Is Priority Issue for Midterm Review, Canadian Official
Says, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1402 (Oct. 19, 1988). Attempts to reach an agreement on
counterfeiting during the Tokyo Round (the previous round of GATT talks) ended in failure.
Intellectual property protection was also left out of the U.S.-Canada free trade agreement be-
cause of the issue's complexity. Id.
179. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 787, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
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first convincing developing nations of the importance of intellectual
property protection. The initiatives could be revived at a later time.
The United States could also consider making major concessions
in order to get foreign intellectual property laws enacted. For in-
stance, trade negotiators are considering a significant change to U.S.
patent law to obtain other concessions from the Japanese. 182 This
proposed change centers on abandoning the first-to-invent system
practiced in the United States in favor of the first-to-file system prac-
ticed in most of the rest of the world.183 Such a concession would be a
considerable change to the U.S. patent law system and has been criti-
cized as reducing the amount of protection to U.S. inventors. 18 4 If the
change results in a substantive trade agreement for intellectual prop-
erty protection, it would be a positive step.
Along the same lines, the United States could consider softening
its stand on compulsory licensing. Practically every other nation al-
lows mandatory licensing, leaving the United States virtually alone in
opposing it. 185 Nations that take the step to protect U.S. patents
should be rewarded by either putting the invention to use or allowing
domestic industries to use the idea. It would cost U.S. industry little
to simply not pursue patents in nations where they have no interest in
using the invention.
Finally, the United States could try harder to show the develop-
ing world the benefit of intellectual property protection. The Com-
merce Department has already instituted training programs and
educational seminars for this purpose. 186 This could be enhanced by
providing incentives to U.S. corporations to locate their operations in
developing nations in exchange for those nations instituting intellec-
tual property protection. This solution would help developing coun-
tries by giving them needed technology and products and help the
United States by increasing its exports.
Even among the pirate nations, there is not a complete consensus
on whether there should be a denial of intellectual property protec-
182. US. May Consider Dropping First-To-Invent Rule To Get Japanese Changes, Panel
Told, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 305 (Mar. 8, 1989).
183. The first-to-invent system, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1982), protects the first inven-
tor and is perceived in the United States as being a more fair system. Most countries use a
first-to-file system, which often results in a race to the patent office. Id.
184. U.S. May Consider Dropping First-To-Invent Rule To Get Japanese Changes, Panel
Told, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 305-06 (Mar. 8, 1989).
185. PATENTS, supra note 19, at U-50; Comment, supra note 47, at 667.
186. Hearings, supra note 7, at 95.
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tion. The violators of intellectual property rights are often well edu-
cated industrialists with strong political ties, who stand to lose much
from increased protection. 8 7 Government leaders are also opposed to
increased protection if it means higher prices on commodities for the
consumers. 188 However, there are supporters for increased protec-
tion, chiefly among innovators, local trading companies and foreign
based investors. 189 The United States could try harder to reach these
local supporters of increased intellectual property protection and en-
courage them to work for changes in their national laws.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States must convince the developing world that
strong intellectual property protection is in every nations' best inter-
est. Since most developing nations have little or no intellectual prop-
erty of their own and lack the technical expertise and financial
resources to produce any, they have trouble becoming motivated to
protect it. On the other hand, developed nations have discovered that
protection provides incentives for research, by rewarding inventors
for their efforts and repaying the high cost of development. Where a
nation fails to protect these rights, there is no incentive for industry to
bring technology there. If developing nations want the developed
countries to supply new technology that will bring them into the de-
veloped world, they must insure that this technology will be
protected.
Unfortunately, too much energy has been expended at the Uru-
guay Round in condemning and defending unilateral U.S. action
under Special 301, rather than in reaching the core issue-protection
of intellectual property rights. Despite the recent breakthroughs, the
United States must continue to exert pressure on GATT to realize a
multilateral intellectual property agreement and resist pressures from
foreign critics of Special 301. Additionally, the United States must
also continue to pursue bilateral agreements with its trading partners
to fill the gaps left by the multilateral agreements. The United States
is a major trading partner of virtually all developing and developed
countries, and our intellectual property is considered to be "one of
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our most valuable trade commodities." 190 If GATT and WIPO, two
multilateral organizations, fail to protect this important U.S. interest,
it is questionable whether the United States should remain a party to
these groups.
The pirates of the 17th century forced their victims to "walk the
plank" to encourage them to disclose the whereabouts of buried trea-
sure.' 91 Similarly, Special 301 encourages foreign nations to protect
U.S. rights under threat of economic punishment. Accordingly, the
United States should be prepared to use Special 301 to "assist" the
multilateral and bilateral negotiations. Special 301 is a formidable
political weapon in fighting the international trade wars. President
Bush has not precisely applied Special 301 as Congress had envi-
sioned; Congress had expected far greater use of the responsive action.
However, the President has discovered that the mere threat of using
the weapon is just as effective in getting the intellectual property pi-
rates to the negotiating table as is the use of the weapon itself. The
Director of the Intellectual Property Office for the USTR praised Spe-
cial 301 for providing the administration with a tool
which to this point has succeeded in getting attention of countries
which otherwise may not have paid as much attention to these is-
sues... and I am optimistic that it will continue to accomplish the
objective of getting us into a negotiating environment where we
can resolve issues by dialogue and discussion rather than
confrontation. 192
The three pronged strategy of multilateral and bilateral negotia-
tions backed by unilateral measures should prove to be very forceful
in achieving and enforcing effective intellectual property agree-
ments. 193 By relying on these combined efforts, the United States will
make intellectual property pirates "walk the plank."
Brian Mark Berliner*
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